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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
S. W. MORRISON, JR., Co-Administrator
of the Estate of Fannie P. Morrison,
deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.WALI(ER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
a corporation, Administrator with the
'Vill Annexed of the Estate of Chauncey
P. Overfield, also known as C. P. Overfield, deceased,

CASE NO.
9380

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff appealed to this Court from the Order for
Nonsuit, made and entered against him by the District
Court of Salt Lake County on 1Iay 20, 1960 (R. 36), and,
from the Order Denying 11otion For New Trial, made
and entered by that Court on June 13, 1960, (R. 38).
1
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The sole issue is whether or not the District Court
erred in denying plaintiff an opportunity to further
prove his case by the testimony of two witnesses. It
ruled that these witnesses were prohibited from testifying
by the provisions of Section 78-24-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (Who may not be witnesses.)
As appears from the pleadings, pretrial order and
proffer of proof, which are part of the record, plaintiff's
cause of action arose from a transaction during May of
1941 when Fannie P. Morrison borrowed $3,500.00 from
Chauncey P. Overfield and secured that loan with 16,136
shares of stock which she then owned in the Independent
Coal and Coke Company. The transaction was negotiated
and consummated by the agents for the respectiv.e parties,
namely, S. W. Morrison, Jr., agent for Fannie P. Morrison, and lone M. Overfield, agent for Chauncy P. Overfield. A receipt or other paper evidencing the terms of
the transaction and acknowledging the deposit of the
stock certificates as collateral security for the loan was
signed. This memorandum was not produced. However,
it remained in the possession of S. W. Morrison Jr. for
some time. Because of a fire in his horne and the resulting confusion, it was temporarily lost. No interest rate
was entered thereon and the rne1norandum made no
provision for foreclosing the pledged collateral and contained no power of sale.
The parties stipulated that the certificates of stock
were never transferred into the name of Chauncey P.
Overfield. Plaintiff's complaint is that, before the loan
2
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beca1ne due, Chauncey P. Overfield, without the knowledge, permission or consent of Fannie P. Morrison, and,
in direct violation of the trust imposed upon him to hold
the stock merely as collateral for the loan, fraudulently
had the stock certificates transferred on the books of
the coal company to the name of his wife, lone M. Overfield, and their two daughters, which transfers he concealed from Fannie P. Morrison and from plaintiff.
By the terms of the loan Chauncey P. Overfield was
to have applied the dividends on the stock to repay the
loan and interest thereon. Regular quarterly dividends
were paid on this stock far in excess of the loan and any
interest thereon, but Chauncey P. Overfield failed to
return the redeemed stock. This was in direct violation
and a repudiation of his trust.
At the time Chauncey P. Overfield violated and repudiated his trust by converting the stock to his own use,
thru having it transferred to his wife and daughters,
it had a value of $16,395.00, and the dividends paid on
the stock over and above the amount of the loan and any
interest thereon amounted to $28,020.34, or a total of
$44,415.34_

Fannie P. Morrison died intestate on November 27,
1941. S. W. l\forrison Jr. is her son and also the coadministrator of her estate and, as such, is the plaintiff
herein. lone M. Overfield is the daughter of Fannie P.
jlorrison and is the widow of Chauncey P. Overfield.
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

He died testate on July 14, 1958. Walker Bank & Trust
Company, the defendant herein, is the administrator with
the will annexed of his estate. lone M. Overfield repudiated the provision made for her in her husband's will
and elected to take the statutory interest in his real property to which she was entitled as his surviving wife.
Within the time for filing claims in the estate of
Chauncey P. Overfield, plaintiff filed a claim against the
estate for the sum of $44,415.34 aforesaid. The claim was
denied and its denial gave rise to the suit for recovery
in the District Court. Plaintiff asserts that Fannie P.
Morrison never learned that Chauncey P. Overfield had
violated and had repudiated the trust imposed upon him
to hold her stock merely as collateral security for the
$3,500.00 loan. Neither did the plaintiff learn these facts
until just prior to the time he filed his claim against
Overfield's estate.
Evidence was adduced at the trial to show transfers
of stock formerly in the name of Fannie P. Morrison
directly to the wife and daughters of Chauncey P. Overfield. Evidence was also adduced to show the dividends
which had been paid on said stock. However, when
plaintiff attempted to prove the other details of the
transaction by the testimony of S. W. Morrison Jr. and
that of lone M. Overfield, defendant objected citing Section 78-24-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, (Who may not
be witnesses) as his reason, and his ·objection was sustained. A proffer of proof covering the testimony 'vhich
these '\vitnesses "rould relate '\Vas made, at the conclusion
4
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of which, the objection was again made and again sustained. Defendant then made a motion for a nonsuit
on the grounds that there was no evidence to substantiate
the allegations and claims of plaintiff. This motion the
District Court granted.
Thus, plaintiff was denied the fundamental right
of using the testimony of his witnesses in the proof of
his case, and therefore, has appealed to this 'C ourt for
relief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Court erred in ruling that plaintiff's witnesses were not competent to testify.

ARGUMENT
The Court erred in ruling that plaintiff's witnesses were not competent to testify.
Prior to analyzing what is suggested as the proper
interpretation to be placed on Section 78-24-2 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 (Who may not be witnesses), which is
the sole issue involved in this ap·p eal, one should realize
that plaintiff was endeavoring to obtain redress of a
wrong which he asserts was committed by a faithless
trustee who fraudulently converted to his own use certain stock belonging to plaintiff's mother which had been
turned over to the said trustee solely for the purpose of
securing a loan. In doing this, plaintiff was using his con5
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stitutional rights as set forth in Section 1 of Article 1
of the Utah Constitution providing in part that "all men
have the inherent and inalienable right to * * * acquire,
possess and protect property" and the constitutional
guaranty set forth in Section 11 of that same constitutional Article providing as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause
to which he is a party.
The District Court of Salt Lake County was the
tribunal in which he sought to obtain redress for the
wrong done. By the court's ruling that the statute prohibited his witnesses from testifying, he was effectually
barred from having his case decided on its merits. The
particular statutory provision invoked as a bar to the
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses "\vas Section 78-24-2
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Who may not be "\Yitnesses),
which states, in part, the follo,ving:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:

* * *( 3)

A party to any civil action, suit or proceeding, and any person directly interested in
the event thereof, and any person from, through
or under "\vhom such party or interested person
derived his interest or title or any part thereof,
when the adverse party in such action, suit or
proceeding clailns or opposes, sues or defends,
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person,
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or as the executor or administrator, heir legatee
or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian,
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by,
or transaction with, such deceased, insane, or incompetent person, or matter of fact whatever,
which must have been equally within the knowledge of both the witness and such insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless such witness is
called to testify thereto by such adverse party
so claiming or opposing, suing or defending, in
such action, suit or proceeding.

The statutory provision quoted above specifies who
cannot testify. It is antagonistic to the constitutional
right that ''all courts shall be open" and that "all men
have the inherent and inalienable right to * * * acquire,
possess and protect property." It is destructive of certain
of those fundamental rights granted by the basic statutory provision set forth in Section 78-24-1 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 (Who may be witnesses), specifying
who can testify. That Section provides in part as follows:
All persons, witho1tt exception, otherwise than
as specified in this chapter * * * may be witnesses.
Neither parties nor other persons who have an
interest in the event of an action or proceeding
are excluded** *. (Emphasis supplied.)
As directed by the broad Constitutional and statutory provisions it would appear to be mandatory to require that the provisions of Section 78-24-1 be interpreted
liberally to permit all persons to testify other than those
7
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specifically excluded, and, to require that the provisions
of Section 78-24-2 be interpreted strictly to exclude from
testifying only those specifically designated to be excluded. This Court appears to have established that interpretation when it said in the case of Sine v. Harper,
118 Utah 415, 222 P2d 571:
The question requiring an answer is, did the
legislature intend to seal the mouths of agents
when it used the words "or any person directly
interested in the event thereof~" In view of the
fact that the section limits the introduction of
testimony which might be of value in determining
the ultimate truth, we are incltned to narrowly
construe the quoted phrase." (Emphasis supplied)
As said by this Court in l\Iaxfield v. Sainsbury, 110
Utah 280, 172 P2d 122:
The purpose of the statute is to guard against
the temptation to give false testimony in regard
to a transaction with a deceased person by the
surviving party, when the transaction is involved
in a lawsuit and death has sealed the mouth of
the other party. Furthermore, the statute seeks
to put the two parties upon terms of equality
in regard to giving evidence of the transaction.
3 Jones Ev. 790; 1\tfiller v. Livingstone, 31 Utah
415, 88 P. 338. It was never intended that this
section should be used for the purpose of suppressing the truth. (Emphasis supplied.)
There are several con trolling reasons 'vhy this statute should not have been applied to prohibit plaintiff's
witnesses from testifying.
8
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First, it should be noted that plaintiff's witnesses
were not the principals to the transaction. They were
merely agents for those principals.

In a very scholarly analysis of Utah's statute designating who may not be witnesses (78-24-2, supra), which
appeared in an article in Vol. 13 of the Rocky Mountain
Law Review, by the Honorable James H. Wolfe, former
Chief Justice of this Court, he pointed out:
Although the question has apparently not been
decided in Utah, there seems to be nothing in the
statute which prevents the agent of a surviving
party from testifying to transactions with the
deceased. Other states have uniformly held that a
party's agent is not incompetent.
Justice Wolfe then cited 21 A.L.R. 928. Subdivision II of
that annotation provides in part at page 928:
In many jurisdictions the statutes relating to
the competency of witnesses where the other party
to the transaction is dead, contain, among other
provisions, a provision that in actions by or
against executors or administrators, in which
judgment may be rendered for or against them,
neither "party" shall be allovved to testify against
the other to any transaction with or statement
by, the testator or intestate, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party, or required to
testify thereto by the court. Under such a stat~tte
it is generally held that an agent of the sttrviving
party is not incompetent to testify as to transactions or communications with a person since de9
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ceased, in an action to which his prtncipal and the
executor or administrator of the deceased are
parties, but to which he is not made a party.
(Emphasis supplied)

Subdivision III of that same annotation then goes on to
provide, in part, at page 931 :
In some instances the statutes contain a provision that in an action or proceeding where the
adverse party sues or defends as executor, or administrator, or legal representative of any deceased person, or as deriving right or title by,
through, or from any deceased person, a "party
in interest" shall not be permitted to testify in his
own behalf as to any transaction had by him with,
or as to any statement made to him by, the deceased. In construing this provision it is generally
held that an agent of the surviving party is not a
party in interest within the meaning of the statute,
and so is not incompetent to testify as to transactions had with the deceased. (Emphasis supplied)
Again, at page 935:
So, in each of the follo,,ing cases, in which it
was held that a husband or wife acting as agent
for the other spouse \vas competent to testify as
to transactions had \Yith a person since deceased:
Porter v. Dunn (1891) 61 Hun. 310, 16 N.Y. Supp.
77, reversed on other grounds in (1892) 131 N.Y.
314, 30 N.E. 122; \Vhit1nan v. Foley (1891) 125
N.Y. 651, 26 N.E. 725, reversing (1889) 26 N.Y.S.
R. 878, 7 N.Y. Supp. 310; Severcool v. Wilsey
(1896) 5 App. Div. 562, 39 N.Y. Supp. 413.

10
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See also the supplemental annotation on this subject
1n 54 A.L.R. 264 and the subsequent citations not yet
annotated.

S. W. Morrison Jr. is not a party to the suit as an
individual. He is a party only in his representative capacity as co-administrator of the estate of Fannie P. Morrison, deceased. His testimony would not concern itself
"\vith conversations or transactions between himself either
as co-administrator or as agent, and the decedent. It
would concern itself with those matters negotiated and
consummated by him as agent for his principal, Fannie
P. Morrison, with lone M. Overfield as agent for her
principal, Chauncey P. Overfield.

Under the decisions referred to above these two
agents should have been permitted to testify.

Second, to be excluded as a witness, the statute provides specifically, that the witness must be ''a party
to the action," or a "person directly interested in the
event thereof," or a p·erson "from, through or under
'vhom such party or interested person derived his interest."

lone M. Overfield is not a party to the action. She
is not one from, through or under whom such party or
interested person derived his interest. The only interest
she cla.:.med in the Overfield estate was the interest she
11
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was entitled to in the estate by her own right as the surviving wife of the decedent, Chauncey P. Overfield. She
had rejected the provision made for her in his will and
had elected to take the statutory interest to which she
was entitled in and to his real property, by virtue of being
his surviving wife. (R. 26) This ·Court has repeatedly
held under such circumstances that the wife does not take
as an "heir" but takes in her own right. See Staats v.
Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 677.

Even should it be assumed that lone M. Overfield
was an "heir" of Chauncey P. Overfield before she renounced the provisions of his will and elected to take in
her own right, there is a serious question as to whether
such an interest as that of an "heir" is an interest sufficiently direct to make her incompetent as a witness. In
the case of Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P. 2d 571,
wherein this Court discussed that phase of the problem
here involved: it was said:
In the annotation in L.R.A. 1917A 32, cases
are cited holding that the interest in the action
must be pecuniary, direct, immediate, and not uncertain, contingent or remote, and that a husband
is not incompetent because he may become a beneficiary under his wife's 'vill or succeed to her property by her intestacy. We held in Olson v. Scott,
61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987, that the plaintiff's husband \Yas entirely con1petent to testify as to statements made by the plaintiff's deceased mother
to the effect that certain bank deposits belonged to
the plaintiff. l\fo\Yer v. l\fower, 64 Utah 260, 228
P. 911, and the general rule on this point as stated

12
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in 58 Am. Jur. 195, Sec. 319, are in accord with
this result. See also Clawson v. vVallace, 16 Utah
300, 52 P. 9.
Neither lone l\1:. Overifeld nor S. W. l\forrison Jr.
were parties as individuals to this action. The interest in
the transaction which lone 1\tf. Overfield may have had
as an heir at one time which she rejected, and the interest
which S. W. l\1orrison Jr. did have in the transaction as
an "heir," were not interests sufficiently direct to make
them incompetent as witnesses. And, as set forth above,
since lone M. Overfield and S. W.

~Iorrison

Jr. were

agents, rather than principals, in the transaction, they
should not have been declared incompetent as witnesses.
Any relevant and material testimony which they could
have given with respect to the transaction should have
been admitted in evidence.

Finally, to be rendered incompetent as a witness, it
is specifically provided that "any statement by," ''transaction with" or "matter of fact whatever," a must have
been equally within the knowledge of both the witness
and such * * * deceased person * * *." (Emphasis supplied)

In this case the loan was not negotiated by the principals or either of them. It was negotiated entirely by

13
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and thru their respective agents. The authorization to
proceed on behalf of Chauncey P. Overfield arose by
means of telephone conversations between him, one of
the principals, and, lone M. Overfield, his agent. (R. 2829) The shares of stock involved were secured from
Walker Bank & Trust Company when an existing loan
against this stock was paid by means of a check or
checks aggregating $3,500.00 drawn on the Irving Trust
Company of New York City given S. W. M·orrison Jr. by
lone M. Overfield. These certificates were then delivered
to lone l\1. Overfield by S. W. Morrison Jr. lone

~1.

Over-

field then gave S. W. Morrison Jr. a written memorandum reciting the tenns of the loan being consummated
and acknowledging the delivery of the certificates as collateral security for the loan. None of the aforesaid conversations or acts took place in the presence of either
principal to the transaction. While each principal was
no doubt bound by the acts of his respective agent, it cannot be said that the ''statements," "transactions" or
"matters of fact" consummating said transaction were
"equally within the knowledge" of the witnesses and the
deceased.
Unless they \vere "equally ":ithin the knowledge" of
the witnesses and the deceased, Section 78-24-2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, ( 'vho n1ay not be 'vitnesses), is not
applicable and the "~itnesses should have been allowed
to testify.

14
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CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of the statute involved, the circumstances under which the loan was consummated, and,
the pertinent court decisions interpreting similar statutory provision, reveals that the District ·Court erred in
ruling that S. W. Morrison Jr. and lone M. Overfield
were not competent witnesses. The case should therefore
be reversed and remanded for trial before the District
Court.
Respectfully submitted,
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
Attorney for Appellant
Suite 1020, Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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